University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

1980

Revitalizing Civil Rights Removal Jurisdiction
Martin H. Redish

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Redish, Martin H., "Revitalizing Civil Rights Removal Jurisdiction" (1980). Minnesota Law Review. 1903.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/1903

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Revitalizing Civil Rights Removal

Jurisdictiont
Martin H. Redish*
In recent years, courts and commentators have debated the
potential effects on the federal system of federal injunctions
against the conduct of state judicial proceedings in order to
protect federal rights. On the whole, the antisuit injunction has
proven to be, at best, of sporadic and limited value as a protector of civil rights.' Although in the last fifteen years the primary focus of both judicial and academic efforts on the subject
of judicial federalism has been the federal injunction, there is a
less frequently discussed alternative method of policing state
judicial enforcement of certain federal rights-one that, at least
on its face, appears to grant the federal courts sweeping authority. The civil rights removal statute, currently codified in 28
U.S.C. § 1443,2 provides this alternative.
t From the forthcoming book, M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER, to be published and copyrighted

by the Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., P.O. Box 7587, Charlottesville, Virginia 22906; reprinted with permission.
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. The author
expresses his appreciation to his colleague, Professor John Elson, for his helpful comments, though Professor Elson is in no way responsible for any of the
views expressed here, and to Lora Sanberg of the class of 1980 and Karen Sesbeau of the class of 1981 at Northwestern University School of Law for their valuable research assistance in the preparation of this Article.
1. See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER chs. 10 & 11 (in press).

2.

Section 1443 provides:
Any of the following civil actions or criminal prosecutions, commenced in a State court may be removed by the defendant to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing
the place wherein it is pending(1) Against any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts
of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights
of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction
thereof;
(2) For any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it
would be inconsistent with such law.
28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1976).
Professor Amsterdam has described the statute as a "text of exquisite obscurity." Amsterdam, Criminal ProsecutionsAffecting Federally Guaranteed
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The civil rights removal statute authorizes removal of a
case from state to federal court in three different contexts: (1)
where a person has been "denied or cannot enforce in the
courts of [a] State" a civil right of equality (the "denial"
clause); (2) where a defendant is being sued or prosecuted for
performing "any act under color of authority derived from any
law providing for equal rights" (the "authority" clause); or (3)
where a defendant is the subject of suit for refusing to perform
an act that would be inconsistent with such a law (the '"refusal"
clause) .3 By far the most extensive judicial attention has been
given to the "denial" clause. 4 As will be discussed below, the
Civil Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdictionto Abort State
Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 793, 843 (1965).
3. See Johnson, Removal of Civil Rights Cases from State to Federal
Courts: The Matrix of Section 1443, 26 FED. B.J. 99, 102 (1966). This Article focuses solely on the scope and construction of the "denial" clause.
4. According to one commentator, the "authority" clause traditionally
"suffered chiefly from lack of attention." Note, A Reexamination of the Civil
Rights Removal Statute, 51 VA. L. REv. 950, 954 (1965). While the "authority"
clause did become the subject of a fair degree of judicial attention in the 1960s,
see, e.g., New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 977
(1965), it was given an extremely narrow construction by the Supreme Court in
City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966). Professor Amsterdam, emphasizing that "the 'color of authority' clause of the 1866 act applies to 'persons'
without explicit limitation to persons acting under federal officers," has argued
that the current version of the statute should be construed to include private
individuals who are acting under the "color" of protective federal statutes. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 877. He has further noted that in 1948, the federal officer removal provision, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), was expanded from its
previously limited applicability to revenue officers to allow removal from state
court by any federal "officer... or person acting under him, for any act under
color of such office." He suggested that if section 1443(2) reaches only federal
officers or those working under them, the section would be rendered superfluous by the broadened language of section 1442(a) (1). Amsterdam, supra note
2, at 878.
The Supreme Court in Peacock, however, rejected these arguments, adopting a much narrower construction of the "authority" clause than the one urged
by Professor Amsterdam. The Court acknowledged that the language of the
current version of the "authority" clause in section 1443(2) "is ... appropriately to be read in the light of the more expansive language of the statute's ancestor," section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 384 U.S. at 815-16.
Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the language and legislative history of
the 1866 Act demonstrated Congress' intent that the removal provision reach
only federal officers and those acting directly under them.
The Court in Peacock acknowledged that the expansion of federal officer
removal in 1948 may have rendered the "authority" clause as construed by the
Court largely superfluous. Id. at 820 n.17. The Court said that nevertheless,
"[t] he present overlap between the provisions simply reflects the separate historical evolution of the removal provision for officers in civil rights legislation."
Id. The Court may have been implying that the Revisers of the Judicial Code
in 1948 simply failed to recognize the potential overlap between the two provisions, and that, in light of the Revisers' disclaimer of any intent to effect substantive change in section 1443, the expansion of section 1442(a) (1) should not
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Supreme Court has improperly allowed the applicability of the
"denial" clause to turn on the nature of the alleged substantive
civil rights violation, while certain lower courts have relied on
the motivation of the prosecutors in bringing the state prosecution 5 As a result, the courts have allowed resort to the "denial"
clause only in the rare instances when a state statute or constitutional provision invades a federal civil right, or when a federal statute immunizes certain conduct from prosecution and
an individual has been prosecuted for the very conduct protected by that statute. The ultimate irony of the courts' construction is that while, as a practical matter, civil rights
removal will be denied in the overwhelming majority of cases,
allowance of removal in the narrow areas in which it has been
authorized is directly contradictory to the tenets of classical judicial federalism, a system premised on the integrity of the
6
state court's role as enforcer and interpreter of federal law.
It is the premise of this Article that traditions of both federalism and statutory language require that applicability of the
"denial" clause should depend neither on the substance of the
state alleged violation nor on the motivation of the prosecutor
in bringing a state prosecution. The "denial" clause should instead be construed to authorize pretrial removal when established state judicial practices and procedures 7 violate a federal
civil right of equality,8 or, if the conduct which is subject to suit
is protected by a federal civil right of equality, when state procedures are so defective or the applicable state precedents so
in conflict with federal law that the defendant will be unable
adequately to vindicate his applicable federal substantive
rights in the state judicial system. Such a construction would
admittedly create the potential for an enormous increase in the
number of removal petitions filed and a concomitant disruption
be construed to expand the "authority" clause through the back door. The
American Law Institute has proposed repeal of the "authority" clause, because
cases covered by it are also covered by section 1442(a) (1). ALI, STUDY OF THE
DMSION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL CouRTs 203-04 (1969).
5. See text accompanying notes 54-55, 79-93 infra.
6. See text accompanying notes 34-37 infra; text following note 59 infra.
7. The word "established" is intended to add the prerequisite that the improper state procedures are not merely aberrations, to be found only in the
court of a particular state judge, but rather are widely accepted in the state judicial system, unless, of course, the state appellate courts have in the past
shown themselves unwilling or unable to rectify the improprieties of the judge
in question.
8. For a discussion of the definition of the statutory phrase "any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States," contained in
the "denial" clause, see text accompanying notes 164-176 infra.
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of the state judicial process. This Article suggests, however,
that the use of both procedural and substantive limitations
would enable the federal courts to revitalize the civil rights removal statute while reducing the potential dangers inherent in
an expanded construction of the "denial" clause.9 Before analyzing the different constructions given the denial clause, this
Article describes the historical development of civil rights removal jurisdiction from its origins in the 1866 Civil Rights Act' 0
to its current status in section 1443.
I.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided former
slaves the
same right ... to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and
give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings11for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white
citizens.

Section 3, the removal section, provided:
[TIhe district courts of the United States, within their respective districts, shall have, exclusively of the courts of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences committed against the provisions of
this act, and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of the United
States, of all causes, civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts or judicial tribunals of the State or
locality where they may be any of the rights secured to them by the
first section of this act; and if any suit or prosecution, civil or criminal,
has been or shall be commenced in any State court, against any such
person, for any cause whatsoever, or against any officer, civil or military, or other person, for any arrest or imprisonment, trespasses, or
wrongs done or committed by virtue or under color of authority derived
from this act or the act establishing a Bureau for the relief of Freedmen and Refugees, and all acts amendatory thereof, or for refusing to
do any act upon the ground that it would be inconsistent with this act,
such defendant shall have the right to remove such cause for trial to
the proper district or circuit court in the manner prescribed by the
"Act relating to habeas corpus and regulating judicial proceedings in
certain cases," approved March three, eighteen hundred and sixtythree ....

12

Enacted as a means of implementing the then recently adopted
thirteenth amendment, 13 the statute provided for removal, according to one commentator, primarily to afford the newly enfranchised blacks access to a more sympathetic federal
9. See text accompanying note 104 infra.
10. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
11. Id. § 1, 14 Stat. 27. The modern descendants of the statute are codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1982 (1976).
12. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
13. See New York v. Galamison, 342 F.2d 255, 259 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 977 (1965).
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A major change in the scope of the removal jurisdiction
was made in the Revised Statutes of 1875.'5 The removal provision became section 641,16 which, while embodying the substance of section 3 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, in certain ways
significantly modified previous practice. Under the 1866 Act, removal was to be utilized initially according to the Habeas
Corpus Suspension Act of 1863,17 which permitted removal after judgment as well as before trial, and subsequently according to the Act's 1866 amendment, 18 which continued to permit
postjudgment removal but which allowed pretrial removal only
prior to the impaneling of a jury.19 The Revised Statutes of
1875, however, made postjudgment removal unavailable, 20 even
though "it was post-judgment removal which the Thirty-ninth
Congress envisioned as the primary means of effectuation of
the purposes of Section 32"21 In 1948, the civil rights removal
14. Morse, Civil Rights Removak "The Letter Killeth, But the Spirit Giveth
Life," 11 How. L. 149, 152 (1965). According to Professor Amsterdam, 'The
pertinent congressional materials do not illuminate the intended scope of this
removal provision." Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 811 (footnote omitted).
15. REV. STAT. § 641 (1875) (enacted during the 1873-1874 congressional session). Congress had reenacted the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in section 18 of the
Civil Rights Act of 1870. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140. See
Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756, 760 (4th Cir.), a ffd per curiam, 384 U.S.
890 (1966).
When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is commenced in any State
court, for any cause whatsoever, against any person who is denied or
cannot enforce in the judicial tribunals of the State, or in the part of
the State where such suit or prosecution is pending, any right secured
to him by any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the
United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States, or against any officer, civil or military, or other person, for any
arrest or imprisonment or other trespasses or wrongs, made or committed by virtue of or under color of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights as aforesaid, or for refusing to do any act on the
ground that it would be inconsistent with such law, such suit or prosecution may, upon the petition of such defendant, filed in said State
court, at any time before the trial or final hearing of the cause, stating
the facts and verified by oath, be removed, for trial, into the next circuit
court to be held in the district where it is pending.
REV. STAT. § 641 (1875) (enacted during the 1873-1874 congressional session).
17. Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755.
18. Act of May 11, 1866, ch. 80, § 3, 14 Stat. 46.
19. See Note, FederalJurisdiction: The Civil Rights Removal Statute Revisited, 1967 DUKE L.J. 136, 139 n.11.
20. The 1875 revision has been referred to by one commentator as "a major
unexplained change in procedure." Id. at 140. Postjudgment removal in civil
cases tried by a jury had been invalidated on the basis of the seventh amendment. McKee v. Rains, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 22 (1870).
21. Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756, 761 (4th Cir.), aff'd per curiam,
384 U.S. 890 (1966).
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provision 22 was recodified into the current section 1443,23 a
change that apparently was not intended to alter the provision's meaning.24
The elimination of postjudgment removal in the Revised
Statutes of 1875 has proven to be the cause of the current limited use of civil rights removal jurisdiction. No longer may a
federal court examine the past conduct of a state court in order
to determine whether a defendant has been denied or was unable to enforce a federal right in state court. Such a determination, if it is to be made at all, must be completed prior to the
state court adjudication. Under this system, the federal court is
called upon to perform the task of predicting whether a particular defendant will be unable to enforce his rights in state court,
a task that the federal courts have been reluctant to perform.
11. THE STRA UDER-RIVES DOCTRINE
In two 1879 decisions, Strauder v. West Virginia25 and Virginia v. Rives, 26 the Supreme Court first considered the difficulties in construction caused by the abolition of postjudgment
removal. In Strauder, a black indicted for murder in West Virginia attempted to remove the prosecution from state court to
federal court. Strauder argued that his equal rights would be
denied in state court, since only white males were allowed by
state statute to serve on a grand or petit jury.27 The state court
denied removal, 28 and Strauder was convicted. The Supreme
Court held that pretrial removal should have been granted
under what was then section 641, since the defendant had
demonstrated that he would be unable to enforce his equal civil
rights in state court because of West Virginia's juror selection
statute.29 In Rives, however, the Court distinguished Strauder
22. Section 641 was carried over into the Judicial Code of 1911. Ch. 231,
§ 31, 36 Stat. 1096. No substantive alterations were made.
23. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 1, 62 Stat. 938.
24. The Supreme Court has stated, "There is no suggestion that the modifications in the statute since 1874 were intended to effect any change in substance." Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 802 (1966).
25. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
26. 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
27. 100 U.S. at 304.
28. State courts no longer have authority to review the validity of a defendant's removal. For an enumeration of the procedural mechanics of removal, see
28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1976 & Supp. I 1977).
29. 100 U.S. at 310-11. The Court found that the West Virginia statute violated the fourteenth amendment, id. at 310, and therefore violated a statute
codifying in part this amendment. See id. at 311-12. This statute is currently
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976):
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and denied removal. 30 Defendants had sought removal, arguing
that, although there was no statute excluding blacks from jury
service, because of community racial prejudice blacks had
never been allowed to serve on county juries in cases concerning a black, and that their requests that blacks be included on
the jury had been rejected by both the state court and the prosecution.
According to the Supreme Court, the key distinction between the two cases was that a state statute had been involved
31
in Strauder, while there was no statute involved in Rives.
The Court stated that when such a statute is present,
the presumption is fair that [the state courts] will be controlled by it in
their decisions .... But when a subordinate officer of the State, in violation of State law, undertakes to deprive an accused party of a right
which the statute law accords to him, . . . it can hardly be said that he
is denied, or cannot enforce,3 2"in the judicial tribunals of the State" the
rights which belong to him.

The Court thus "established a relatively narrow, well-defined
area in which pre-trial removal could be sustained. '33 The distinction that gave rise to this "well-defined area," however, is
puzzling in light of long-established principles of judicial federalism.
Since Justice Story's decision in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee,34 it has been accepted that state courts are bound by
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts,
to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains,
penalties, taxes, llcenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
30. 100 U.S. at 321-22.
31. "[Section 641] does not embrace a case in which a right may be denied
by judicial action during the trial, or by discrimination against [the defendant]
in the sentence, or in the mode of executing the sentence." Id. at 319.
32. Id. at 321 (quoting section 641).
33. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 797 (1966). Referring to Rives and its
progeny, the Court in City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 (1966), stated:
Those cases all stand for at least one basic proposition: It is not
enough to support removal under § 1443 (1) to allege or show that the
defendant's federal equal civil rights have been illegally and corruptly
denied by state administrative officials in advance of trial, that the
charges against the defendant are false, or that the defendant is unable
to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court. The motives of the officers bringing the charges may be corrupt, but that does not show that
the state trial court will find the defendant guilty if he is innocent, or
that in any other manner the defendant will be "denied or cannot enforce in the courts" of the State any right under a federal law providing
for equal civil rights.
Id. at 827-28 (emphasis in original) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1)).
34. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 340-41 (1816).
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the supremacy clause of the Constitution 35 to enforce applicable principles of federal statutory and constitutional law in
state proceedings.3 6 Indeed, the assumption that state courts
are fully competent to adjudicate and enforce federal rights underlies the Madisonian Compromise, under which Congress is
not required to establish lower federal courts. 37 Given this
principle, it should be expected that a state court will invalidate a state law that violates federal statutory or constitutional
rights. By allowing removal from state to federal court when a
state statute violates federal law, the Supreme Court in
Strauder seems to have been casting aspersions on both the
competence and good faith of state courts. Furthermore, the
distinction drawn between Strauder and Rives is not logically
convincing: if state courts are not competent to apply overriding federal law when a state statute is involved, why can they
be trusted to correct nonstatutory state practices that have, in
38
the past, violated federal law?
The language in Rives suggests a possible, but unlikely, alternative rationale for the distinction. The Court may have
been implying that, until state practice is either codified by
statute or approved by the state's highest court, it is not "state
action" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Although
the Court had, on occasion, endorsed such a position in other
contexts,3 9 the view has long since been discredited. 40 A more
pragmatic explanation of the Strauder-Rives distinction lies in
the fact that it provides a limited, easily applied standard to define the scope of civil rights removal jurisdiction. If the Court
35.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

36. See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
37. See generally Redish & Woods, CongressionalPower to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis,
124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 52-56 (1975).
38. According to Professor Amsterdam,
[T]he case in which there exists a state statutory or constitutional provision barring enforcement of a federal right is the case in which removal to a federal trial court is least needed. The existence and effect
of such an obvious, written obstruction of federal law are relatively
easily perceived and coped with on direct review of a state court judgment by the Supreme Court of the United States. Where removal is
most needed is the case in which the impingement on federal rights is
more subtle, more immune against appellate correction, as where state
court hostility and bias warp the process by which the facts underlying
the federal claim are found.
Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 857-58 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
39. See, e.g., Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430, 440-41 (1904). See
also Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 17 (1944) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
40. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 110-11 (1945); Home Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 283-84 (1913).
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had authorized removal in Rives, it would have been allowing
federal courts to engage in a detailed, case-by-case examination
of both customary state practice and a specific state court's
willingness to depart from practices found to violate federal
law.
Although there is nothing in either the language or history
of the civil rights removal laws to justify the distinction, 4 1 the
Rives doctrine was nevertheless consistently adhered to by the
Supreme Court in a series of decisions from 1880 to 1906.42 The
final decision in that series, Kentucky v. Powers,43 illustrates
the awkwardness of the Rives-Strauder dichotomy. 44 The de41. Furthermore, it is questionable whether friction in the federal system
is avoided by the blanket assumption implicit in Strauder that all state courts
will disregard overriding federal law when an invalid state statute applies. Professor Amsterdam has argued that Rives might be read as holding "no more
than that the removal petitioners' allegations were insufficient to state a case of
unconstitutional jury discrimination under the standards then prevailing, and
its comments on the existence or nonexistence of discriminatory legislation are
merely speculation on sorts of allegations which would be sufficient." Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 845. He acknowledged, however, that "the case may also
be read rather loosely as saying that unless a state constitution or statute on its
face denies a defendant's federal constitutional rights, his case is not removable under present subsection 1443(1)." Id. One year after Professor Amsterdam's article, the Supreme Court, in City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S.
808, 828 (1966), reaffirmed the latter construction. See text accompanying notes
61-62 infra.
42. Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 30-32 (1906); Williams v. Mississippi, 170
U.S. 213, 219-20 (1898); Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101, 105-06 (1896); Smith v.
Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592, 600 (1896); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 582-83
(1896); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 116 (1882); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370,
386-87 (1880). This line of decisions may be summed up by the holding in
Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896), that removal was to be denied because
"[n]either the constitution nor the laws of Mississippi, by their language reasonably interpreted, or as interpreted by the highest court of the State, show
that the accused was denied or could not enforce [his civil rights] in the judicial tribunals of the State." Id. at 600.
In Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880), the state constitution on its face
unconstitutionally did discriminate against blacks in voting. See id. at 387. Although a state statute provided that jury selection was based on voter lists, id.
at 388, the Supreme Court affirmed the state court's denial of removal. Id. at
393. The Court reasoned that while the state constitutional provision in question had never actually been repealed or overturned, "[b]eyond question the
adoption of the Fifteenth Amendment had the effect, in law, to remove from the
State Constitution or render inoperative, that provision which restricts the
right of suffrage to the white race." Id. at 389. The Court emphasized that
since adoption of the fifteenth amendment, there had been no legislation or
state case law inconsistent with the terms of that provision. Id. at 390.
43. 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
44. It is probable that if the Powers case were to arise today, removal
could be denied on the ground that no right guaranteeing racial equality was
involved. See text accompanying notes 168-169 infra. The actual analysis employed by the Court in Powers, however, turned on the conclusion that petitioner had failed to demonstrate that any right would be "denied" in state
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fendant in Powers was charged in state court as an accessory to
murder, despite his contention that he had received a full pardon from the state's lawfully elected governor. The victim had
been the Democratic candidate for governor, the opponent of
the Republican governor who issued the pardon. The defendant had been prosecuted and convicted three times, and although the conviction was reversed each time, he was never
allowed to introduce the pardon into evidence. Prior to the
fourth trial, the defendant attempted to remove the prosecution
to federal court, describing this history and further arguing that
in his past trials the jury had been purposely selected from
among members of the Democratic Party. Although, in the
words of a modern court, "[iif anyone was ever able to show
unfairness in advance of the trial, Powers was," 45 the Supreme
Court denied removal.
The Court recognized that "the suggestion is, in effect, that
there was a deliberate purpose on the part of those charged
with the administration of justice in that locality to take [the
accused's] life, under the forms of law, even if the facts did not
establish his guilt of the crime charged. '46 Yet the Court, continuing to adhere to the doctrine articulated in Rives, held that
removal was inappropriate simply because "[ilt is not contended, as it could not be, that the constitution and laws of
Kentucky deny to the accused any rights secured to him by the
47
Constitution of the United States or by any act of Congress."
The empty formalism of the Rives doctrine becomes glaringly apparent when applied in Powers. Distorted fact-finding
by a prejudiced jury is one of the most difficult improprieties
for the Supreme Court to police. If the petitioner was to be believed, there could be little doubt that he had been and would
continue to be the victim of serious political discrimination in
state court. It is patently unrealistic to suggest that the state
court will enforce federal protections under such circumstances.
III.

RACHEL, PEACOCK AND BEYOND

The Supreme Court did not return to the question of the
court. The case is discussed because of the continued vitality of its interpretation of the "denial" clause.
45. Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756, 769 (4th Cir.), afd per curiam,
384 U.S. 890 (1966).
46. 201 U.S. at 33.
47. Id at 35.
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scope of the "denial" clause until 1966,48 after a statutory
change in the nature of appellate review of remand orders was
adopted by Congress for the very purpose of facilitating
Supreme Court reconsideration of the issue.49 The Court's reconsideration came in two decisions handed down the same
day, Georgia v. Rachel5 0 and City of Greenwood v. Peacock.5 1
In Rachel, black individuals who had sought service at certain
Atlanta hotels and restaurants were indicted under a local trespass statute for refusing to leave when requested to do so. The
defendants sought removal to federal court, arguing that their
federal rights could not be enforced in state court. Although
the Supreme Court allowed removal, it continued to adhere to
the Strauder-Rives distinction, despite the fact that no state
constitutional or statutory provision on its face denied the defendants their federal rights. The Court emphasized the Rives
language that "denial" meant "primarily, if not exclusively, a
denial ...
resulting from the Constitution or laws of the
State."5 2 By emphasizing a phrase that was quite probably intended as a throwaway in Rives, the Court managed to stretch
Strauder beyond the limited situation of a directly applicable
invalid state statute or constitutional provision. 53 In the case
before it, said the Rachel Court, the "denial" could be found by
other means. The key was in the nature of the federal right defendants were asserting-the right of access to public accom48. According to one commentator, "the restrictive construction [imposed
by Rives] was followed faithfully by the lower federal courts until 1965." Johnson, supra note 3, at 139-40.
49. See Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 901, 78 Stat. 266 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (1976)). As a result of this 1964 amendment, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(d) now provides:
An order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise, except that an order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed pursuant to section 1443 of this title shall be reviewable by appeal or other-

wise.
According to Professor Amsterdam, "There can be no doubt that Congress,
making explicit provision by the 1964 Civil Rights Act for the appeal of remand
orders in removed civil rights cases, expected that the Supreme Court would
limit or overrule Rives-Powers." Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 911.
50. 384 U.S. 780 (1966).
51. 384 U.S. 808 (1966).
52. 384 U.S. at 804 (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. at 319) (emphasis
added in Rachel).
53. The Court failed to discuss the problem that had always plagued the
Strauder decision, namely the decision's failure to recognize the fact that state
courts are obligated under the supremacy clause of the Constitution to invalidate state statutes or constitutional provisions found to be in conflict with federal law. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
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modations, a right guaranteed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act: 54
In the narrow circumstances of this case, any proceedings in the courts
of the State will constitute a denial of the rights conferred by the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as construed in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill [379 U.S.
306 (1964) ], if the allegations of the removal petition are true.5 5

According to the Rachel Court, Hamm made clear that the
1964 Civil Rights Act-held to apply retroactively-protected
those who asserted the right to be served in public accommodations "not only from conviction in state courts, but from prosecution in those courts. '5 6 Both Rachel and Hamm emphasized
the terms of section 203(c) of the Act,57 which prohibits "any
attempt to punish" individuals for exercising their statutory
rights. This section led the Rachel Court to conclude that "[iut
is no answer in these circumstances that the defendants might
eventually prevail in state court. The burden of having to defend the prosecutions is itself the denial of a right explicitly
conferred by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... ,58 Since the
prosecution itself was a violation of a federal right, there was
no difficulty in "predicting" whether a federal right would be
denied in state court; it already had been.
Difficulties plague the Court's analysis in Rachel. The federal right to be served in public accommodations was violated
only if the request to leave had been motivated by racial considerations. If, for example, the defendants were asked to
leave, not for racial reasons but because the store was closing,
their refusal to leave would, of course, not be immune from
prosecution for trespass. In that situation, there would have to
be a judicial hearing to determine the motivation for, and the
circumstances surrounding, the request to leave. The Supreme
Court acknowledged this fact.5 9 What the Court did not seem
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-2 (1976).
55. 384 U.S. at 804 (emphasis in original).
56. Id. (emphasis in original).
57. No person shall (a) withhold, deny, or attempt to withhold or deny,
or deprive or attempt to deprive, any person of any right or privilege
secured by section 2000a or 2000a-1 of this title, or (b) intimidate,
threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any
person with the purpose of interfering with any right or privilege secured by section 2000a or 2000a-1 of this title, or (c) punish or attempt
to punish any person for exercising or attempting to exercise any right
or privilege secured by section 2000a or section 2000a-1 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 2000a-2 (1976).
58. 384 U.S. at 805 (footnote omitted).
59. The Court held:
[I]f as alleged in the present removal petition, the defendants were
asked to leave solely for racial reasons, then the mere pendency of the
prosecutions enables the federal court to make the clear prediction
that the defendants will be 'denied or cannot enforce in the courts of
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to recognize, however, was that since the defendants had to be
subjected to judicial action at least to the extent of the factual
hearing, presumably the same factual inquiry could be made in
state court as in federal court.
The Court's logic thus fails: the fact that defendants have a
right not to be prosecuted for their refusal to leave if asked to
do so solely for racial reasons does not automatically lead to
the conclusion that the defendants will be denied that right in
state court, any more than it means they will be denied that
right by the holding of a factual hearing in federal court. By
necessary implication, then, the grant of removal in Rachel reflects the Supreme Court's lack of trust in the ability of state
courts to engage in the same factual inquiry that the Court authorized to be made by the federal court. Yet it is the avoidance of such an implication that had prompted the Supreme
Court to refuse removal in Rives, a decision that the Court purported to adhere to in Rachel.
The Court's adherence to Rives was made in even stronger
terms in Peacock. In that case, people who had engaged in civil
rights work in Mississippi during the spring and summer of
1964 were charged with various offenses in violation of Mississippi law. Specifically, they were charged with obstructing the
public streets, assault, disturbing the peace, creating a public
disturbance, inciting to riot, biting a policeman, and various
other crimes. All sought removal to federal court pursuant to
section 1443, arguing that they had been prosecuted because of
their efforts to register black voters. The Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit allowed removal, distinguishing the Rives line
of decisions on the ground that those cases had involved the
operation of the heart of the state judicial process. 60 The
Supreme Court reversed, 61 and in doing so attempted to distinguish Rachel. The Court stated that while in Rachel the fed[the] State' the right to be free of any 'attempt to punish' them for protected activity.
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1)) (bracketed word added in Rachel). The Court
then concluded that "[slince the Federal District Court remanded the present
case without a hearing, the defendants as yet have had no opportunity to establish that they were ordered to leave the restaurant facilities solely for racial
reasons." 384 U.S. at 805.
60. We would not expand the teaching of these cases to include state
denials of equal civil rights through the unconstitutional application of
a statute in situations which are not a part of the state judicial system
but which, on the contrary, arise in the administration of a statute in
the arresting and charging process.
Peacock v. City of Greenwood, 347 F.2d 679, 684 (5th Cir. 1965), rev'd, 384 U.S.
808 (1966).
61. Justice Douglas, writing for four Justices, dissented. 384 U.S. at 835. He
argued that "the language 'cannot enforce' [in 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1)] has refer-
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eral statutory right was a protection against even an "attempt
to prosecute them for their conduct," in Peacock "no federal
law confers an absolute right on private citizens ... to obstruct
a public street, to contribute to the delinquency of a minor, to
drive an automobile without a license, or to bite a policeman."
Additionally, the Court continued, "no federal law confers im' 62
munity from state prosecution on such charges.
The Court appeared to be drawing two distinctions
between Peacock and Rachel: first, the petitioners in Peacock,
unlike the respondents in Rachel, were charged with acts that
were unprotected by federal law; and second, unlike the corresponding law in Rachel, the federal law that the petitioners in
Peacock claimed to be unable to enforce in state court did not
immunize them from prosecution. The petitioners in Peacock
could therefore rely on the state courts to protect them from
improper conviction, and, if convicted, could ultimately obtain
63
review in the Supreme Court.
While, as will be seen in subsequent discussions, the
Court's first basis for distinction is subject to doubt,6 its second ground is even more questionable. The federal statute
thought by the Court in Rachel to "immunize" defendants from
prosecution, it should be recalled, prohibited "any attempt to
punish" individuals who exercised their rights. Yet the statute
relied on by petitioners in Peacock to justify removal prohibited anyone from "attempt[ing] to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any other person for the purpose of interfering with the
right of such other person to vote or to vote as he may
choose. '65 If the very act of bringing a prosecution constitutes
an "attempt to punish" the exercise of the statutory right, it is
unclear why the same act does not also constitute an "attempt
to intimidate, threaten, or coerce." True, the bringing of a prosecution is by definition an "attempt to punish," though a desire
to intimidate can be only its motivation. Such conceptualizations, however, should not be allowed to obscure the fact that,
if the allegations of the Peacock petitioners were accurate, the
very act of bringing the prosecutions constituted an attempt to
ence to an anticipated state court frustration of equal civil rights." 384 U.S. at
841 (emphasis in original).
62. 384 U.S. at 826-27.
63. Id. at 828.
64. See text accompanying notes 94-101 infra.
65. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b), quoted in City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S.
808, 811 n.3 (1966).
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intimidate the petitioners. 66
Judicial opinions have attempted to explain the Peacock
Court's second ground in ways that substantially limit its effect. Shortly after Peacock, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit suggested two narrowing explanations. First, the court
argued, the similarity in language between the statutes in
Rachel and Peacock "was not urged upon the court." 67 This
fact, however, is of little assistance in limiting Peacock. On the
very same day that Peacock was decided, the Supreme Court
fashioned its theory of removal in Rachel. It would not seem to
have been difficult for the Court itself--even without the aid of
petitioners' brief-to recognize the potential applicability of the
theory to the facts of Peacock. In fact, as the Peacock opinion
demonstrates, the Court considered and rejected the possible
68
relevance of Rachel's analysis to Peacock.
The Fifth Circuit's second proffered explanation of the
Rachel/Peacock "immunity from prosecution" distinction was
that the Supreme Court may simply have concluded that section 1971, the statute primarily relied on by petitioners for removal in Peacock, "did not cover the factual situation alleged in
the removal complaint. '69 Section 1971(b) prohibited intimidation "for the purpose of interfering with the right of [another
person] to vote or to vote as he may choose. '70 Yet the conduct
in which the Peacock petitioners claimed they were engaged
was not the act of voting.7 1 Although Congress broadened the
law in 1965 by enacting section 1973i(b), which prohibited intimidation for purposes of interfering with the act of urging
others to vote,7 2 that statute was not in effect at the time of removal, and therefore could not have been relied on by the Pea66. See North Carolina v. Hawkins, 365 F.2d 559, 561-62 (4th Cir.) (Sobeloff,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 949 (1966).
67. Whatley v. City of Vidalia, 399 F.2d 521, 525 (5th Cir. 1968).
68. 384 U.S. at 827 n.25. See New York v. Horelick, 424 F.2d 697, 702-03 n.4
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 939 (1970).
69. 399 F.2d at 526.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1971(b) (1976).
71. 384 U.S. at 826.
72. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 11(b), 79 Stat. 443
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1973i(b) (1976)). The current statute provides:
No person, whether acting under color of law or otherwise, shall intimidate, threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for voting or attempting to vote, or intimidate,
threaten, or coerce, or attempt to intimidate, threaten, or coerce any
person for urging or aiding any person to vote or attempt to vote, or intimidate, threaten, or coerce any person for exercising any powers or
duties under section 1973a(a), 1973d, 1973f, 1973g, 1973h, or 1973j(e) of
this title.
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According to the Fifth Circuit's interpretation, the "intimidation" language in statutes such as sections 1971(b) and
1973i(b)-when those statutes are applicable-could be
equated with the "attempt to punish" language relied on in
Rachel to justify removal. Since those statutes were not applicable in Peacock, according to the Fifth Circuit, removal was
properly denied. However, the Court in Peacock did not, at
least explicitly, rely on the theory that the statute cited by the
petitioners was substantively inapplicable to the facts. The
Court instead emphasized that the statute did not contain the
"attempt to punish" language of the public accommodations
law involved in Rachel.7 4 Thus, the Fifth Circuit did not adequately explain an important rationale offered by the Supreme
Court for distinguishing Peacock from Rachel-in Peacock, the
federal law that the petitioners claimed they could not have enforced in state court did not immunize them from prosecution.
The other ground for the denial of removal in Peacock, it
should be recalled, was that the petitioners, unlike those in.
Rachel, had been charged with the commission of acts that in
themselves were unprotected by federal law. Although this rationale may be criticized on several grounds, 75 it was clearly relied on by the Court in Peacock and has been subsequently
reaffirmed.7 6 Before considering these criticisms, then, it is
necessary to determine how this element of Peacock's analysis
is to be applied in order to be able to predict when removal will
be allowed in the future under the "denial" clause. Such a task
is not an easy one, given the difficulty in reconciling this
ground for the Peacock decision with the rationale of Rachel in
allowing removal. As could be expected, there was considerable controversy in the lower federal courts in the ensuing years
over the proper line to be drawn between applicability of the
two decisions.
The controversy was over which of the two factors relied on
to distinguish Peacock from Rachel was to take precedence.
The issue becomes important in cases in which only one of the
two distinguishing factors is present. Such a situation would
arise in a case in which defendants seek removal on grounds
that the prosecution violates their immunity under the 1964
73.
74.
75.
76.

399 F.2d at 522.
384 U.S. at 827 n.25.
See text accompanying notes 94-101 infra.
See Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975).
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Civil Rights Act, but the state charge is for purported illegal
conduct other than that protected by the statute. For example,
suppose individuals attempting to exercise their rights under
the 1964 Civil Rights Act are arrested, not for trespass after refusing to leave when asked, but for disorderly conduct. Just as
in Peacock, where there was no federal right to obstruct the
streets or to bite a policeman, 77 there is also no right to be disorderly. Of course, the charge may be false, merely an attempt
to harass defendants for exercising their federal rights, but the
same could also have been said of the charges in Peacock. The
situation becomes even more complicated if one assumes that
hours or even days after asserting their rights to be served at
public accommodations, the individuals are arrested for robbery, or murder, and those individuals allege that the charges
are merely a pretext for punishing them for the exercise of
their rights under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Would such a
case be controlled by Rachel, because the federal right claimed
by the defendants to be "denied" was the right under the 1964
Civil Rights Act, which immunizes them from prosecution, or
would it be controlled by Peacock, because the state charges al78
lege conduct not protected by a federal right?
One approach to these questions, the "scope of conduct"
test,79 has been identified most closely with the Second and
Third Circuits. Under this theory, Rachel is construed narrowly to apply only when the state has, in effect, substituted a
crime for a right, or when, as one commentator has phrased it,
"the conduct necessary for conviction under the state statute is
... specifically insulated by a federal equal rights law."80 In
Hill v. Pennsylvania,81 for example, the Third Circuit held:
The statutes relied upon in Rachel necessarily displaced any state
laws which would proscribe the act of remaining in public accommodations when asked to leave on account of race by prohibiting attempted
punishment for this act. However, when statutes, such as those relied
upon in Peacock, grant one a right not to be intimidated for efforts to
accomplish a particular goal or while asserting a specific right, we cannot ascribe to Congress an intent to displace state laws which regulate
one's conduct while attempting to exercise the right unless, of course,
the federal right permits specific acts which are proscribed by state
law, or the state law, in effect, forecloses a reasonable possibility of en77. See text accompanying note 62 supra.
78. These questions are raised and considered in detail in Note, Civil
Rights Removal After Rachel and Peacock" A Limited Federal Remedy, 121 U.
PA. L REV. 351 (1972).
79. The approach was given this label by a dissenter to its application.
Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7, 29-30 (5th Cir. 1972) (Brown, C.J., dissenting).
80. Note, supra note 78, at 366.
81. 439 F.2d 1016 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
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The court construed Peacock as holding that specious arrests
on false charges "would not provide a basis to predict that the
claimed right would inevitably be denied in a state court. '8 3
The Second Circuit adopted a similar position in New York
v. Davis,84 as did the Fourth Circuit in Frinks v. North Carolina.85 Frinks illustrates that, under the "scope of conduct"
approach, the mere fact that the public accommodations provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act are asseited as a basis for removal will not bring the case within Rachel. Petitioners in
Frinks had been charged with engaging in a riot and inciting to
riot. They claimed that they had been engaged only in legitimate and peaceful civil rights marches and boycotts and were
being prosecuted for having exercised their federal rights, in
particular those guaranteed by the 1964 Civil Rights Act. The
Fourth Circuit denied removal, distinguishing the charge of inciting to riot from the trespass charge in Rachel,86 and concluding that "[t]he 1964 Civil Rights Act does not in any sense void
87
the anti-riot laws of North Carolina.
The Fifth Circuit has traditionally taken a broader view of
Rachel, as illustrated by its decision in Achtenberg v. Mississippi.88 The petitions for removal in that case asserted that the
"charges of vagrancy were based exclusively on attempts by
the appellants to exercise rights guaranteed them under the
1964 Civil Rights Act."89 The court concluded that "[tihe utter
82. 439 F.2d at 1021.
83. Id.
84. 411 F.2d 750 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 856 (1969).
The line is thus between prosecutions in which the conduct necessary
to constitute the state offense is specifically protected by a federal
equal rights statute under the circumstances alleged by the petitioner,
and prosecutions where the only grounds for removal are that the
charge is false and motivated by a desire to discourage the petitioner
from exercising or to penalize him for having exercised a federal right.
411 F.2d at 754.
85. 468 F.2d 639 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 920 (1973).
86. In Frinks,the court reasoned that
[a]s an exercise in probability prediction, we may confidently assert
that there is a far greater probability that a trespass warrant will be
flawed by a policy of invidious discrimination than that a riot warrant
will be similarly invalidated. This is so because the riot warrant will be
valid if violence (the essential element) occurred, whereas the trespass
warrant may be void even though presence over the protest of the owner (the essential element) is admitted. This is so, in turn, because
peaceful presence is protected and violence is not.
468 F.2d at 643.
87. Id. at 642-43.
88. 393 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1968).
89. Id. at 469.
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baselessness of any conceivable contention that the vagrancy
statutes prohibited any conduct in which these persons were
engaged, merely buttresses the undisputed evidence ... that
these protected acts constituted the conduct for which they
were then and there being arrested." 90 Since the charges in
Achtenberg, unlike those in Rachel, were not on their face for
conduct protected by federal law, the "scope of conduct" approach would seem to have dictated the denial of removal. 91
The Fifth Circuit-unlike other circuits92--relied on whether
the petitioner was prosecuted for the exercise of federal rights
immune from prosecution, not on "the characterization given to
93
the conduct in question by a state prosecutor."
Both the language and thrust of Peacock seem to support
the narrower construction given the "denial" clause by the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits, 94 though such a construction
90. Id. at 474. See also City of Baton Rouge v. Douglas, 446 F.2d 874 (5th
Cir. 1971); Walker v. Georgia, 417 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1969); Whatley v. City of Vidalia, 399 F.2d 521 (5th Cir. 1968).
91. Judge Godbold concurred in part and dissented in part in Achtenberg.
He concurred as to three petitioners arrested for vagrancy while sitting in the
Hattiesburg, Mississippi, public library. As to those individuals, he reasoned,
The use of the label "vagrancy" in the charges against them instead of
the label "trespass" does not require a result different from Rachel.
The inquiry is to the scope and character of the conduct engaged in by
the accused, not to categorizations, accurate or inaccurate, given to that
conduct in the making of criminal charges.
393 F.2d at 476.
However, Judge Godbold believed that Peacock controlled a fourth petitioner, who was arrested for vagrancy after she had left both the public library
and a public lunch counter. "There is," he said, "no federal right to be a vagrant or a federal immunity from groundless arrest on a vagrancy charge." Id.
But the same could, of course, have been said of the other petitioners, who had
also been charged with vagrancy. In any event, the formalism of Judge
Godbold's suggested distinction-between arrests made at the time the federal
rights were asserted and those made shortly after their exercise-renders the
distinction unhelpful.
92. See text accompanying notes 79-87 supra. The Second Circuit, in New
York v. Davis, 411 F.2d 750 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 856 (1969), left open
in a footnote the question "whether, despite what seems to be the contrary
thrust of Peacock, a prosecution may be removable under § 1443(1) if the defendant claims he was engaged in conduct so closely related to that protected
by the federal equal rights statute that the criminal charges are only 'convenient tags.'" 411 F.2d at 754 n.4 (citing Achtenberg v. Mississippi, 393 F.2d 468,
475 (5th Cir. 1968), in which the court referred to a criminal statute as a "convenient tag").
93: Walker v. Georgia, 417 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1969).
94. The Court stated in Peacock:
The motives of the officers bringing the charges may be corrupt, but
that does not show that the state trial court will find the defendant
guilty if he is innocent, or that in any other manner the defendant will
be "denied or cannot enforce in the courts" of the State any right
under a federal law providing for equal civil rights.
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renders Rachel all but useless. Under the "scope of conduct"
approach, all that local authorities acting in bad faith need do
to avoid removal is to charge the defendant with an act not protected by federal law, even though that charge is false and
merely a camouflage for the authorities' real motive, which is to
punish the defendant for exercising his federally protected
rights. To ensure the avoidance of federal removal, the authorities would be advised to bring the false charge at a time shortly
95
after the defendant has exercised his federal right.
Although the language in Rachel seems to support the narrow "scope of conduct" approach to the distinction between
Rachel and Peacock, the reasons thought to justify it are unpersuasive. 9 6 In Frinks,the Fourth Circuit emphasized in support of this approach that "the facts are not ascertainable
without a hearing-either in a federal or state court,"97 and that
Peacock had been designed to avoid such an inquiry. While
the court acknowledged that a hearing would have to be held
under Rachel, such a hearing "was justified . . .by the great
probability that'a federal right would be denied if the prosecution were not removed," 98 a probability not present when the
prosecution was for inciting a riot, rather than for trespass.
This asserted distinction is difficult to comprehend. There appears to be neither a statistical nor an intuitive basis for the
court's assertion "that there is a far greater probability that a
trespass warrant will be flawed by a policy of invidious discrimination than that a riot warrant will be similarly invalidated." 99
384 U.S. at 827-28 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1)).
95. For an articulate attack on a narrow construction of Rachel and a broad
reading of Peacock, see Chief Judge Brown's dissent in Perkins v. Mississippi,
455 F.2d 7, 11 (5th Cir. 1972).
Note, however, that the dangers described in text are present, even under a
broader reading of Rachel. While courts adopting such an approach are more
willing to attempt to ascertain the true motive for the prosecution, regardless of
the label used, their factual findings may nevertheless be influenced by a temporal or geographical distance between the protected conduct and the prosecution. See Perkins v. Mississippi, 455 F.2d 7, 11 (5th Cir. 1972) ("It is important,
in our view, that the disturbance at the jail was neither geographically nor periodically incidental to the marches .... "). Thus, maliciously motivated local
officials could, through fairly elaborate planning, circumvent even a broader
construction of Rachel.
96. This is not to suggest that it was not the distinction intended by the
Supreme Court. In fact, examination of the Court's opinion in Peacock tends to
demonstrate that, despite its illogical foundation, the "scope of conduct" analysis was the one intended by the Court. See text accompanying notes 105-109
infra.
97. 468 F.2d at 642.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 643.
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It is true, of course, that "the riot warrant will be valid if violence (the essential element) occurred, whereas the trespass
warrant may be void even though presence over the protest of
the owner (the essential element) is admitted."' 00 But this in
no way requires the conclusion that the former charge is less
likely to be false or the product of racial prejudice. Moreover,
while the factual inquiry into the validity of the charge might,
on occasion, be less intricate when the charge is for trespass,
this makes even more questionable the Rachel Court's decision
to withdraw this less involved factual inquiry from the state
courts. 10 1
IV. A REVISED CONSTRUCTION OF THE "DENIAL"
CLAUSE
Although the arguments against the "scope of conduct"
theory effectively demonstrate the logical fallacies of the distinction drawn between Rachel and Peacock, they are largely
beside the point. Under section 1443(1), the issue is not
whether the charges are false or have been brought in bad
faith. Rather, the inquiry must be directed to whether or not
an individual's equal federal rights will be denied "in the courts
of [a] State."' 0 2 It is logically irrelevant to that inquiry whether
the prosecution has been brought in bad faith. If the state
courts are as capable and willing as their federal counterparts
to enforce federal rights, they will presumably dispose of the
100.

Id.

101. The Court's most recent statement on the scope of Peacock came in
Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975). But while that decision reaffirmed
the narrow construction given the civil rights removal statute in Peacock; id. at
227-28, it has no relevance to the controversy over the line of demarcation
between Peacock and Rachel, since the civil right relied on in Johnson did not
derive from the public accommodations provision of the 1964 Civil Rights Act or
from any other statute deemed to immunize defendants from the very act of
prosecution.
102. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1976). Justice Douglas, dissenting in Peacock, argued that the words "who is denied" and "cannot enforce" in the removal statute must be distinguished. He would read the words "in the Courts of such
State" as modifying only the "cannot enforce" language. The result is that removal would be allowed if a state defendant had been "denied" his rights by
any state official, not just by the state courts. 384 U.S. at 843-44 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Thus, a right may be "denied" by the state "at any time-before,
as well as during, a trial." Id. at 844. Removal would be allowed under his analysis "when 'disorderly conduct' statutes, 'breach of the peace' ordinances, and
the like are used as the instrument to suppress [a defendant's] promotion of
civil rights." Id. at 842. But while Justice Douglas believed "that this reading of
the provisions is more in keeping with the spirit of 1866," id. at 844, he cites no
legislative history to support his seemingly artificial separation of the "is denied" and "cannot enforce" language of the removal statute.
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false prosecution, as would the federal court.103 The most serious difficulty with Peacock, then, is not that it permits prosecutors easily to avoid Rachel-though it certainly does that. The
crucial problem is the continued adherence to the same mistaken assumption made in Rives and Powers-in the absence
of an unconstitutional state statute, state courts will necessarily adhere to federal substantive and procedural standards. A
more appropriate construction of the "denial" clause would dictate that removal be allowed when a state defendant is asserting a right under a law providing for equal rights, 104 and he can
establish that, either because of the procedures employed in
the court or because of applicable substantive holdings in the
state court system, he will be denied that right in the state proceeding.
It is true, of course, that the Rachel-Peacock and StrauderRives distinctions have the effect-admittedly intended by the
Supreme Court--of substantially limiting the number of successful civil rights removal petitions. This fact alone, however,
cannot justify the distinctions, even if one were to accept the
idea that such a limitation is advisable. A rule allowing removal only by those defendants with red hair would have the
same effect, yet no one would countenance such an irrational
line of demarcation. It remains to be seen whether the distinctions drawn between Rachel and Peacock on the one hand, and
Strauder and Rives on the other, have much more relevance to
either the language or policies of the removal statute.
In Peacock, petitioners argued that the state courts, as well
as local law enforcement officials, "were prejudiced against
them because of their race or their association with Negroes,
and because of the commitment of the courts and officers to the
State's declared policy of racial segregation.' 0 5 They also
claimed that
the trial would take place in a segregated courtroom, that Negro witnesses and attorneys would be addressed by their first names, that Negroes would be elcluded from the juries, and that the judges and
prosecutors who would participate in the trial had gained office at elec10 6
tions in which Negro voters were excluded.

If these allegations were true, it is difficult to believe that peti103. This point is similar to the criticism directed at the logic behind a "bad
faith" prosecution exception to the Younger doctrine. See Redish, The Doctrine
of Younger v. Harris: Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CoRNELL L. REV.
463, 473-74 (1978).
104. For a discussion of the meaning of this phrase, see text accompanying
notes 164-176 infra.
105. 384 U.S. at 813 n.6.
106. Id.
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tioners would have been able to enforce their rights in the state
courts.
The Court in Peacock construed the "denial" clause narrowly, because it feared that any broader reading of the civil
rights removal statute might seriously disrupt the state judicial
process:
[E]very criminal case in every court of every State-on any charge
from a five-dollar misdemeanor to first-degree murder-would be removable to a federal court upon a petition alleging (1) that the defendant was being prosecuted because of his race and that he was
(2) that he
completely innocent of the charge brought against him,1 0or
7
would be unable to obtain a fair trial in the state court.

'The civil rights removal statute," said the Court, "does not require and does not permit the judges of the federal courts to
put their brethren of the state judiciary on trial,"' 08 despite the
fact that, as noted previously, by allowing removal in both
Strauder and Rives the Court necessarily presumed that the
state judiciary would be unwilling or unable to fulfill its duty to
enforce federal law. 109
But the Court's concerns cannot be summarily dismissed.
If the Court had rejected the limits imposed by the Rives-Powers line of cases, the results would have been: (1) that federal
judges would be forced to sit in judgment on the good faith of
their state counterparts; and (2) that state defendants could seriously disrupt the state judicial system simply by removing,
asserting that their rights could not be enforced in state court.
While in many of the cases the federal courts would ultimately
remand after determining that the contentions were baseless,
the disruptive delay in state prosecutions might be significant.
Perhaps the easier of the two arguments to deal with is the
first. The simple answer to the contention that a broader reading of section 1443(1) requires the federal courts to hold their
state brethren up to scrutiny is that the statute's language dictates that such an inquiry be made. Removal is to be allowed if
a defendant "is denied or cannot enforce" his federal rights in
the state court. This language seems to dictate that the federal
court inquire whether the state court will "deny" defendant
that right." 0 If its procedures are improper or discriminatory,
107. Id. at 832 (footnote omitted).
108. Id. at 828.
109. But see text accompanying notes 34-37 supra; text following note 59
supra.
110. The Court's argument that removal need not be granted because of the
availability of ultimate review in the Supreme Court, 384 U.S. at 828-29, is not
dispositive, since by its terms, section 1443(1) makes clear that, at least under
certain circumstances, Congress did not believe that ultimate Supreme Court
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or its view of the substantive law inconsistent with federal
standards, the state court will "deny" defendant his federal
right. That the Court would not allow removal under such extreme circumstances as those in Rives and Powers"' demonstrates the impropriety of the Court's current construction of
the "denial" clause. If the Court is not to abrogate congressional will by effectively rendering useless a federal statute, the
only alternative is to make a case-by-case inquiry into whether
or not a particular defendant will be denied his rights in the
2
state court."
There is, in any event, an air of "Catch 22" about the argument that the examination of state trial procedures in a caseby-case fashion unduly increases federalistic tension. Jurists
who have opposed the use of federal injunctions against state
prosecutions have done so largely on the basis of the historic
fungibility of state and federal courts. Justice Harlan, for example, dissenting in Dombrowski v. Pfister,"3 rejected what he
considered to be the majority's "unarticulated assumption that
state courts will not be as prone as federal courts to vindicate
constitutional rights promptly and effectively." He argued that
"[s]uch an assumption should not be indulged in the absence
of a showing that such is apt to be so in a given case."11 4
Though Justice Harlan's statement was made in dissent in
Dombrowski, his view has triumphed in a series of decisions,
beginning with Younger v. Harris,"5 which severely limit the
power of the federal courts to enjoin state prosecutions.
The "denial" clause of the civil rights removal statute
seems to fit well with the traditional concept of the "fungibilreview was an adequate remedy. Moreover, in light of the enormous number of
cases in which Supreme Court review is sought, the likelihood of Supreme
Court review is, at best, speculative. Additionally, perhaps the greatest danger
resulting from biased state courts is that, through evidentiary rulings and findings of fact, they will all but insulate their decisions from effective appellate review. In any event, the argument regarding the availability of Supreme Court
review would also be applicable to a case like Strauder,yet the Court continues to adhere to that decision's allowance of removal.
111. See text accompanying notes 30, 43-45 supra.
112. This approach might cut back on the availability of removal under
traditional standards, since no longer would the presence of an invalid state
statute be taken to mean that a defendant will automatically be denied his
rights in state court, as it is under Strauder. See text accompanying notes 31-38
supra.
113. 380 U.S. 479, 498 (1965).
114. Id. at 499 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
115. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977);
Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975);
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
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ity" of state and federal courts as enforcers of federal rights.
Unlike commentators who urge a sweeping federal usurpation
of state court power to adjudicate federal civil rights, 1 6 the
drafters of the statute seemed to proceed under the assumption
that state courts are, on the whole, fully capable of vindicating
federal rights. Only in those instances in which it can concretely be shown that state courts, for whatever reason, will not
be able to enforce certain federal rights does the statute direct
the federal court to intervene. The statute, then, does not engage in the assumption condemned by Justice Harlan. On the
contrary, the statute is fully compatible with his rejection of
the assumption that the state court adjudication will be inadequate, in the words of Justice Harlan, "in the absence of a
showing that such is apt to be so in a given case." 1 7 Yet those
who oppose a case-by-case application of the "denial" clause
will not even allow a state defendant to attempt to make such a
showing "in a given case." The case-by-case scrutiny of the
"denial" clause, far from increasing federalistic tensions, will
likely reduce such tensions in most cases by enabling the federal courts to vindicate the legitimacy of state court competence and procedures. In the comparatively rare instance in
which the case-by-case approach results in the usurping of
state court jurisdiction, such vindication would be unwarranted
in any event.
The fear of a case-by-case examination of state court action
is somewhat puzzling, in light of the long-standing practice of
the federal courts to review the decisions and rulings of state
courts in habeas corpus proceedings. 1 8 While the Supreme
Court has in recent years limited the availability of this remedy
in certain instances," 9 it has also significantly expanded the
scrutiny that federal courts give to state court findings in
120
habeas proceedings. Most recently, in Jackson v. Virginia,
the Court stated that in reviewing a state conviction on habeas,
a federal court could determine whether a "rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt."' 2 ' Certainly this question is one that state
courts are traditionally called upon to answer. Yet, because
116. See, e.g., Amsterdam, supra note 2. See text accompanying notes 127132 infra.
117. 380 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
118. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976). See generally Amsterdam, supra note 2.
119. See, e.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
120. 99 S. Ct. 2781 (1979).
121. Id. at 2789.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 64:523

due process rights are bound up in making that decision, the
federal courts in habeas proceedings are able to review this
state court determination.
There are, of course, a number of differences between the
review exercised on habeas corpus on the one hand and a caseby-case application of the civil rights removal statute on the
other. Habeas corpus occurs after completion of the proceedings in the state courts, while civil rights removal will be allowed only prior to the conduct of state judicial proceedings.
Because of this distinction, civil rights removal causes potentially greater disruption to the state judicial process than the
disruption attendant to habeas proceedings. The removal statute by its terms, however, contemplates a certain amount of
disruption. By explicitly calling for pretrial removal, the civil
rights removal statute represents a congressional determination that those denied specified civil rights in state court need
not suffer the physical, financial, and emotional expense of a
state trial. While such a value judgment was not the only conceivable one Congress could have made, the fact remains that
122
it is the one Congress did make.
The other problem caused by pretrial removal, a problem
not present in the postjudgment habeas corpus context, is the
difficulty facing the federal court in predicting whether or not
the defendant will be unable to enforce his rights in state court.
This problem, however, can be alleviated by placing a heavy
burden on the defendant to demonstrate that state practices
will prevent him from effectively enforcing his rights in state
courts. 123 To meet this burden, petitioner would be required to
establish a historic pattern of denial in the particular state
court system, 124 by proving either well-established practice or
the presence of traditionally followed court rules that prevent
an individual from enforcing his rights. 125
Even if it were conceded that such a case-by-case analysis
122. As will be seen in subsequent discussion, there are ways to minimize
the disruptive effect caused by increased resort to the civil rights removal remedy. See text accompanying notes 153-156 infra.
123. As Justice Douglas argued, dissenting in Peacock: "A district judge
could not lightly assume that the state court would shirk its responsibilities,
and should remand the case to the state court unless it appeared by clear and
convincing evidence that the allegations of an inability to enforce equal civil
rights were true." 384 U.S. at 852 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
124. In making the inquiry into whether an individual will be denied his
rights in state court, it would probably be inappropriate to consider the likelihood that a particular state judge would act improperly, unless the state appellate courts have in the past refused to correct that judge's improper practices.
125. Under this approach, if petitioners in Peacock had been able to prove
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might produce a certain degree of friction within the federal
system, it would not follow that the approach should be rejected. By recognizing even the possibility that federal rights
could not be enforced in state court, the drafters of section
1443(1) and its predecessors apparently concluded that the cre12 6
ation of such friction is a necessary by-product of the statute.
In his seminal work on civil rights removal, 127 Professor
Amsterdam advocates a construction of the statute in certain
ways broader and in other ways narrower than the one advocated here. He would allow removal when a state defendant
makes "a colorable showing that the conduct for which he is
prosecuted was conduct protected by the federal constitutional
guarantees of civil rights."12 In such instances, "the appropriate federal district court [is] to entertain and dispose ... of
the whole prosecution . . . in advance of state trial-and this
without regard to whether [petitioner] also claims that the
state courts are hostile, biased, conspiratorial, or incompetent."'129 However, where the asserted basis for removal is not
constitutional protection of the conduct that is the subject of
prosecution but rather only a constitutional infirmity in the
state's procedures, Professor Amsterdam would reluctantly 30
allow removal only when, as under the Strauder-Rives doctrine,
a state statute or constitutional provision on its face violates a
federal constitutional guarantee. 13' Professor Amsterdam is
thus never willing to trust to state courts the task of initially intheir contentions about the conduct of trials in state court, see text accompanying notes 105-106 supra,removal would undoubtedly have been allowed.
126. In any event, the blanket insult to state judicial systems that underlies
the allowance of removal in both Strauder and Rachel cannot help but cause
federal-state friction. Strauder implicitly assumes that all state courts will be
unable or unwilling to obey the command of the supremacy clause to invalidate
state laws in conflict with federal statutory or constitutional provisions, and
Rachel implicitly assumes that all state courts will be unable or unwilling to
recognize the impropriety of certain prosecutions as quickly as would a federal
court. Recall that removal will be allowed under Rachel only if, after a factual
hearing, it is determined that the sole basis for prosecution was the defendant's
exercise of his federal right to be served at public accommodations. See text
accompanying notes 50-59 supra. But the Supreme Court allowed the federal
court to make this factual inquiry without any consideration of whether or not
the state court could have made the same inquiry.
127. Amsterdam, supra note 2.
128. Id. at 804.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 912 ("I am far from satisfied with that result.").
131. Id. at 862, 911-12. Professor Amsterdam does recognize that "Strauder
might perhaps be extended to cases in which the highest court of a State has
previously rejected federal procedural claims identical to petitioner's, and no
intervening decisions of that court or of the federal courts suggest that the previous ruling will be reconsidered." Id. at 912. In a certain sense, this extension
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validating state prosecutions that attack constitutionally protected conduct, but he is always willing to give them this
opportunity-in the first instance, at least132-- when the federal
challenge is merely to one of their own judicially established
procedures.
Professor Amsterdam justifies his distinction not on the basis of congressional intent in drafting the removal statute 133 but
rather on pragmatic grounds. He rejects a case-by-case inquiry
because the investigation necessary in each instance would be
both inconvenient for and embarassing to the state courts. 13 4
But removal should automatically be allowed if and only if a
colorable showing is made of constitutional protection of the
conduct for which prosecution has been brought, he argues, because such instances are relatively rare and in any event there
is greater need of early federal intervention in such cases. 135
For several reasons, the construction suggested by Professor Amsterdam must be rejected. The first obstacle to his construction is the language of the removal statute itself. By its
terms, the "denial" clause allows removal only to those who are
"denied or cannot enforce [specified federal rights] in the
courts of" a state.136 Though state judges may on occasion lack
the experience, independence, or competence of most federal
judges, they continue to provide, under the supremacy clause,
at least begins to approach the case-by-case analysis, combined with the heavy
burden of proof imposed on petitioner, urged here.
132. Professor Amsterdam implicitly recognizes, of course, the availability
of review by the United States Supreme Court on direct review and by the
lower federal courts on habeas corpus. See id. at 861.
133. In the words of one commentator, "the legislative history is sparse and
ambiguous as to the intended scope of this removal remedy." Note, supra note
19, at 171. Professor Amsterdam himself seems to acknowledge the unhelpful
nature of the legislative history in providing a basis for any particular construction of the statute. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 814. Certain evidence from the
legislative history may, in fact, undermine Professor Amsterdam's construction.
Senator Trumbull, chief drafter of the Act of 1866, stated in his response to
President Johnson's veto:
Now, [a person] is not necessarily discriminated against, because there
may be a custom in the community discriminating against him, nor because a Legislature may have passed a statute discriminating against
him; that statute is of no validity if it comes in conflict with a statute of
the United States; and it is not to be presumed that any judge of a State
court would hold that a statute of a State discriminatingagainsta person on account of color was valid when there was a statute of the
United States with which it was in direct conflict ....
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1759 (1866) (emphasis added). It thus does
not appear that Senator Trumbull, at least, questioned the ability of state
courts in all cases to enforce federal rights.
134. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 858.
135. Id. at 861.
136. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1976). See note 2 supra.

19801

REMOVAL JURISDICTION

at least a technically adequate forum for the enforcement of
federal rights. 137 It therefore cannot be said-at least without
more concrete legislative history than seems to be available'38-that Congress believed that a defendant would be inherently unable to enforce his substantive civil rights in state
court. If Congress had intended the result urged by Professor
Amsterdam, it could easily have enacted a statute so stating. It
did not, and it is difficult to distort its language to achieve that
result.
It is equally difficult to read into the statutory language the
dichotomy suggested by Professor Amsterdam between prosecutions of constitutionally protected conduct and constitutional
infirmities in state procedures. The statute provides simply
that removal is authorized when a defendant is denied in state
court "a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights
of citizens of the United States.' 39 There appears to be nothing in the legislative history-and there certainly is nothing in
the statutory language-to justify a distinction between procedural and substantive rights.
Similarly unpersuasive are the pragmatic justifications
cited by Professor Amsterdam to support his overly broad
reading of the removal statute for substantive constitutional violations and his unduly narrow reading for challenges to state
procedures. To justify a blanket allowance of removal when a
colorable showing is made that the state prosecution is for constitutionally protected conduct, he argued that a case-by-case
examination of the state court's ability to enforce federal guarantees would cause significant federal-state friction. 140 Yet it
certainly does not seem solicitous of state sensibilities to make
the implicit assumption that a state court will in every case be
141
an inadequate protector of substantive constitutional rights.
137.

See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).

138.

See note 133 supra.

139. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1976). See note 2 supra.
140. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 858.
141. Professor Amsterdam argues that "[not all intrusions are equally
abrasive." Id. at 835. He points out that little federal-state friction is caused by
the availability of diversity and federal question jurisdictions, despite the fact
that "the assumptions supporting these jurisdictions are a quite unpleasant reflection on the state judiciary." Id. The lack of friction results, he says, because
such cases "are clearly, cleanly, and completely excluded from the state courts'
ken." Id. But the exercise of these jurisdictions by the federal courts is very
different from the exercise of civil rights removal jurisdiction. The availability
of the federal courts as a forum for the adjudication of federal questions may
merely reflect the conclusion that a litigant should be given the option of having his case heard in the forum most familiar with the relevant principles of
law. It would not seem to insult the state judiciary to suggest that its primary
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Moreover, under Professor Amsterdam's construction, once a
colorable showing is made that defendant's conduct is constitutionally protected, the entire prosecution is to be disposed of in
the federal court.142 Even if the federal issue is ultimately decided against the removal petitioner, the federal court will thus
usurp the state court's traditional function of finding facts and
applying state law to vindicate the policies of the state's criminal statutes. This is a potential incursion into the state's legitimate province not present under the case-by-case analysis
urged here.
An important pragmatic justification relied on by Professor
Amsterdam to support his extremely narrow reading of the removal statute as applied to alleged procedural infirmities is the
number of removal petitions a broader reading would alsheer
low. 1 43 But Professor Amsterdam's fear must be viewed in light
of his very expansive reading of the nature of the federal right
that would justify removal. Though the statutory language
speaks only of "a right under any law providing for the equal
civil rights of citizens of the United States,"' 44 Professor Amsterdam assumed "that the civil rights removal statute protects
all civil rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.' 45 If
this were the accepted reading of the statute, the number of
cases subject to removal under the case-by-case analysis would
be truly significant. As Professor Amsterdam correctly pointed
out, "[t] he register of federal procedural claims which might be
isolated before trial-jury prejudice, denial of speedy trial, coerced confession, illegal search and seizure, deprivation of
counsel at pretrial stages-has expanded considerably."' 46 As
function is the adjudication of state, rather than federal law. By contrast, civil
rights removal is to be permitted only when a petitioner "is denied or cannot
enforce" his civil rights in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1976). If the
Supreme Court were to authorize removal in every case in which a substantive
constitutional defense was raised, the Court would thus inescapably be saying,
not merely that a federal forum may be preferable, but that in such situations
the state courts are simply unable or unwilling to enforce federal rights.
Nor is the existence of diversity jurisdiction comparable to Professor Amsterdam's construction of the "denial" clause in its potential for causing federal-state friction. Whatever the origins of the diversity jurisdiction, its
existence has been known from the nation's beginnings. Regardless of whether
or not state judges were miffed at the time of the jurisdiction's creation, it is
thus unlikely that its continued existence today can or will have such an effect.
The same cannot be said, of course, of Professor Amsterdam's construction of
the civil rights removal statute.
142. See text accompanying notes 128-129 supra.
143. See Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 912.
144. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1976). See note 2 supra.
145. Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 863 (footnote omitted).
146. Id. at 912.

1980]

REMOVAL JURISDICTION

will be seen in subsequent discussions, 147 however, neither
before nor after the publication of Professor Amsterdam's article has the category of rights authorizing removal been so
broadly construed. The Supreme Court reaffirmed in Rachel
that it is only rights of racial equality to which the civil rights
removal statute extends. 148 While such a construction appears
unduly begrudging in its limitation of the statute to rights of racial equality,149 the statutory language does seem limited to
rights against discriminatory treatment. Thus the only state
procedural infirmities that would trigger the need for a case-bycase analysis-at least when the conduct that forms the basis
for the prosecution is not itself protected by a right included in
the removal statute' 5 0 -are those claimed to discriminate improperly. This substantially reduces the number of instances
in which removal may be successfully sought.
Professor Amsterdam's construction, then, is rife with
problems. But neither is the revised construction advocated in
this Aritcle15 ' free from difficulty. For any expansion of the
"denial" clause would present at least some danger of increased interference with the operation of the state judiciary.
The current interpretation of the "denial" clause makes clear to
the overwhelming majority of state defendants that removal is
unavailable. Unless the defendant has been immunized from
prosecution by a federal statute or there exists an applicable
unconstitutional state statute, a state court defendant may not
rely on the "denial" clause to obtain removal. Under the revised construction urged here, a defense attorney may reasonably seek removal if he or she believes there is any possibility
of establishing the inadequacy of state practices. It may subsequently be determined that the state practices are valid, but a
defense attorney could well have concluded at the outset that
there existed sufficient doubt to justify the attempt. Though
the case will then be remanded, the removal process will have
caused significant interference in the operation of the state judicial process. Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the altered construction of the "denial" clause will,
147. See text accompanying notes 164-176 infra.
148. 384 U.S. at 792. See text accompanying note 169 infra.
149. See text accompanying notes 171-176 infra.
150. When the basis for civil rights removal is not that state procedures are
improperly discriminatory but that the conduct subject to prosecution is protected by a federal right of equality, it would presumably be necessary for the
federal court to consider whether the state's procedures are so inadequate that
the petitioner will be unable to enforce his federal right in the state court.
151. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
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in fact, substantially increase the number of removal petitions,
given the substantial burden the construction advocated in this
Article would place upon the removing party to establish the
152
existence of improper state practice.
If a substantial increase in the number of removal petitions
does prove to be the result of the case-by-case analysis, it is
possible to devise a method that will guarantee a state defendant access to federal review of his claim that he will be unable
to enforce his equal rights in state court while, at the same
time, avoiding substantial disruption of the state judicial process. Both goals could be substantially achieved through a combined use of a suit injunction and civil rights removal. 5 3 By
this process, a state defendant would first be required to seek a
preliminary injunction of his state prosecution, on the ground
that he will be unable to enforce his federal equal rights in
state court. If, and only if, the federal court grants the preliminary injunction would the defendant be allowed to invoke removal under section 1443(1). This procedure would likely
reduce the number of frivolous or overzealous attempts to remove and thereby diminish the disruption of the state judicial
process. Under the current scheme, when a defendant files a
petition for removal, the proceedings in state court are required
to stop automatically. 154 Though the federal court may con152. At least one commentator has questioned the conclusion that a danger
to the state judicial process might result from broader use of civil rights removal:
Because the initiative in seeking removal lies with the defendant, the
number of cases removed would largely depend on expectations that
particular state courts will not dispense equal justice. A defendant will
not incur the expense and delay of removing to federal court if he is
confident of the fairness of the local court. Removal would be useful
primarily in those states in which there is a problem of discrimination
on the part of the police and the local courts.
Note, Civil Rights Removal: City of Greenwood v. Peacock and Georgia v.
Rachel, 14 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1159, 1169 (1967).
153. In denying removal in Peacock, the Court noted that "there are many
other remedies available in the federal courts to redress the wrongs claimed by
the individual petitioners in the extraordinary circumstances they allege in
their removal petitions," and cited in particular the possible availability of a
suit injunction under Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). 384 U.S. at 829.
While Dombrowski has been limited dramatically by the Court's decisions in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny, it is at least arguable that
Dombrowski would still allow an injunction against the Peacock prosecutions.
Younger recognized a limited vitality for Dombrowski-type injunctions when
the state prosecution has been brought in bad faith. Id. at 47-49. The allegations in Peacock appear to meet these criteria.
154. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (Supp. I 1977), when a petition for removal is
filed in federal court, "the State court shall proceed no further unless and until
the case is remanded."
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elude, after a hearing, that removal is improper and that the
case should therefore be remanded, the state proceeding may
already have suffered significant disruption. If a state defendant is required first to obtain a federal injunction, the state proceedings will not be forced to cease until the federal court has
made an initial determination of the probable merit of the state
defendant's contentions. 5 5 In this manner, clearly meritless
removal petitions may be disposed of without causing significant and unnecessary interference in the state system. 5 6
There are a number of questions to which this suggested
approach gives rise. The first-and most significant-is
whether the federal judiciary may itself establish the prerequisite of preliminary injunctive relief, or whether such action
must come from Congress. Although the federal removal statutes are currently quite clear that no injunctive relief is required for the cessation of state proceedings, 157 an argument
might be fashioned to support the judicial authority to interpose this procedural barrier. In a line of cases most closely as155. It might be argued that insertion of an injunction requirement would
not significantly reduce the disruption of the state judicial process because,
even under the current framework, the state may seek an immediate remand.
The injunction requirement, however, would alter the current situation in two
important respects. First, it would shift the burden of seeking federal judicial
assistance from the state to the removal petitioner. The "inertia" would be in
favor of the case remaining in state court, and it is the petitioner who would
have to seek out federal court aid to have the case removed to federal court,
rather than the reverse. Secondly, under the current system, even if the state
were to seek an immediate remand, there can be no assurance that the federal
court will rule on that motion with alacrity. The state judicial process will
therefore remain halted until the federal court rules on the remand. With the
injunction requirement, the removal petitioner would seek either a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction, and if the state continues to proceed with the prosecution pending the federal court's ruling on the petitioner's
motion, the federal court would be all but forced to issue a speedy ruling.
156. In ruling upon a motion for a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a federal court will usually be presented with a dilemma. On
the one hand, the petitioner may persuasively argue that he should not be required at such an early stage to make a detailed showing of the invalidity of
state practices; extensive discovery might be required before petitioner could
conclusively establish the relevant supporting facts. On the other hand, the injunction requirement would have little value as a limit on overuse of the removal remedy if unsupported allegations concerning the unconstitutionality of
state practices would supply a sufficient basis for the issuance of preliminary
federal injunctive relief.
To resolve this dilemma, the federal court would presumably attempt to
strike a middle ground. The petitioner would probably be required to present
something more than mere conclusory assertions, such as supporting affidavits.
However, the court would not require definitive proof before issuing preliminary injunctive relief.
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (Supp. I 1977).
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1 58
sociated with Younger v. Harris,
the Supreme Court has
recognized the power of the federal courts to interpose procedural barriers to the enforcement of otherwise unencumbered
federal rights in the interest of comity within the federal system.1 5 9 Although, as I have noted in another article,160 the
Younger doctrine goes too far in its efforts to avoid federalstate friction, the Court was quite probably correct in recognizing its broad authority in this area. The insertion of a preliminary injunction prerequisite to the use of the civil rights
removal remedy could arguably be viewed as the exercise of
the same inherent authority.'6'
The primary difficulty with this argument is the fact that
the injunction requirement does not merely procedurally limit
an otherwise unencumbered statute; it directly contradicts the
terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e), which expressly provides that,
upon filing of the removal petition and bond, "the State court
shall proceed no further unless and until the case is remanded."'162 It is therefore doubtful that a preliminary injunction prerequisite could be inserted without congressional
action.
It may seem unlikely that Congress would take such action
in the foreseeable future, but it should be recalled that the injunction prerequisite is recommended only if it is ultimately
determined that the increase in the number of removal petitions under the revised construction urged here is of such a
magnitude as to burden the federal courts significantly or to seriously disrupt the state judicial process. If these consequences did result, it is possible that Congress would consider
amendment of the civil rights removal statute to avoid these
dangers. The preliminary injunction prerequisite is suggested
as a procedural means of accomplishing these goals without
limiting the substantive reach of the removal statute.

158. 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See cases cited note 115 supra.
159. See generally Redish, supra note 103; Whitten, FederalDeclaratoryand
Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and
the Limits of JudicialDiscretion, 53 N.C. L. REV. 591 (1975). This is referred to
as a "procedural" barrier because, under the doctrine of Younger, the substantive right under section 1983 is not limited. Rather, the Court is merely limiting
the procedural avenues open to the litigant to enforce that right by requiring
that he raise his contentions in the state court proceeding.
160. Redish, supra note 103, at 488.
161. It might be thought that a judicially created preliminary injunction requirement would run afoul of the Younger doctrine, which prohibits federal
courts under most circumstances from enjoining state prosecutions. But
Younger should not be a problem, once it is recalled that the injunction requirement is suggested here as a substitute for an automatic cessation of state
judicial proceedings.
162. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(e) (Supp. I 1977).
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It might be thought that the preliminary injunction prerequisite would not satisfactorily avoid the disruptive impact of a
broadened reading of the civil rights removal statute, since the
preliminary injunction prerequisite requires state prosecutors
to wage a "two-front" war, by prosecuting defendants in state
court while at the same time being called on to defend state
practices in a federal court proceeding. But state prosecutors
must defend every time a state defendant removes to federal
court, no matter how frivolous the attempt. Furthermore, it is
unlikely that state interests would be advanced if the prosecutor had to litigate only in the federal forum, since this would
mean that the state judicial process would come to a grinding
halt. Ultimately, the extra litigation burdens that may be imposed on state prosecutors are a relatively small price to pay to
ensure the early protection of federal rights.
A final question is whether removal is even necessary if an
injunction has been granted. It should be recalled, however,
that under the revised interpretation of the "denial" clause suggested in this Article, 163 removal may be allowed under certain
circumstances, even if the prosecution is a perfectly appropriate one. For example, removal would be allowed if the state
court procedures and practices are such that federal rights cannot be enforced there. The state court procedures, then, would
be the subject of federal inquiry in the injunction proceeding.
The issuance of a preliminary injunction in federal court would
thus mean only that the state judicial procedures have been
called into question. The actual substantive prosecution would
still have to be adjudicated, after the case has been removed to
federal court.
It should be emphasized that the approach described here
is very different from accepted practice. The Rives-Powers line
of decisions, in addition to Rachel and Peacock, represents
firmly established federal law, not likely to be questioned in
the near future. This Article's proposed alterations of that accepted practice are designed to provide an alternative if and
when the Supreme Court reconsiders the scope of the "denial"
clause.
V. A FINAL NOTE: THE DEFINITION OF LAWS
PROVIDING FOR "EQUAL RIGHTS"
One continuing controversy over the meaning of both the
163.

See text accompanying note 104 supra.
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"denial" clause and other sections of the civil rights removal
statute has concerned the proper definition to be given the
phrase "law providing for.., equal civil rights." The "denial"
clause applies only when a state defendant cannot enforce "a
right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States.' 64 Thus, even in the limited circumstances under which civil rights removal has been authorized,
removal can be obtained only if the federal right involved is a
right of equality.
This reference to "equal rights" was not contained in section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.165 That Act provided for
removal only when the specific rights of racialequality guaranteed in the Act itself were involved.166 It was not until the Revised Statutes of 1875 were enacted that the broader language
concerning equal rights was added.167 Even this more expansive language has been narrowly interpreted, however. In
Rachel, while recognizing that the "equal rights" language was
not limited to protection of civil rights enacted prior to 1875,168
the Court stated: "On the basis of the historical material that is
available, we conclude that the phrase 'any law providing for
...equal civil rights' must be construed to mean any law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality.' 69 Therefore, according to the Court, assertions of first
due procamendment free speech and fourteenth amendment
170
ess rights cannot trigger civil rights removal.
Though the explicit language of section 1443 would seem to
support the Court's exclusion of free speech and due process
rights from the statute's scope, the accuracy of the Court's limitation of civil rights removal to rights of racial equality is not
as clear.' 7 ' While it is true that the original removal statute
spoke solely in terms of racial equality, the statute's current
164. 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1) (1976) See note 2 supra.
165. See Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27, quoted in text accompanying note 12 supra.
166. See Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788-89 (1966). See also Note, supra
note 19, at 152-53.
167. See REv. STAT. § 641 (1875) (enacted during the 1873-1874 congressional
session), quoted in note 16 supra.
168. 384 U.S. at 789. It was on this basis that the Court in Rachel allowed
removal under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
169. Id. at 792.
170. Id. These rights do not fall within the terms of the civil rights removal
statute, said the Court, "because the guarantees of those clauses are phrased in
terms of general application available to all persons or citizens, rather than in
the specific language of racial equality that § 1443 demands." Id.
171. Nevertheless, the Court in Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213, 219
(1975), reaffirmed this limitation.

1980]

REMOVAL JURISDICTION

language contains no such limitation. Furthermore, the Court
itself has recognized that the drafters of subsequent versions of
the civil rights removal statute did not intend to limit the applicable substantive rights to preexisting ones: "Congress' choice
of the open-ended phrase 'any law providing for... equal civil
rights' was clearly appropriate to permit removal in cases involving 'a right under' both existing and future statutes that
provided for equal rights.' 72 The Court continued, however.
"In spite of the potential breadth of the phrase 'any law providing for ... equal civil rights,' it seems clear that in enacting
§ 641 [of the Revised Statutes of 1875], Congress intended in
that phrase only to include laws comparable in nature to the
Civil Rights Act of 1866."' 73 However, the accuracy of the
Court's interpretation of the drafters' intent to limit civil rights
removal to rights protecting racial equality is open to question. 74
The Court has come a long way from its original assumption that the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection was limited to racial equality. 7 5 Since the language of
section 1443 is not limited to racial equality, and the legislative
history of the section's predecessors is unclear, perhaps a similar recognition of the expanding concept of equality should be
imposed upon construction of the civil rights removal statute.
Unless the Supreme Court reconsiders this further narrowing
of the scope of section 1443, however, it appears that the lower
courts will continue to reject attempts to invoke civil rights removal to protect federal rights guaranteeing nonracial forms of
76
equality.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Because of a narrow construction justified neither by statu172. Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 789 (1966).
173. Id. at 789-90.
174. According to one commentator,
The racial criterion [of Rachel] is particularly suspect in view of the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870. While the
principal rights provided with removal protection by these statutes are
admittedly expressed in terms of racial equality, it is also true that one
specifically defined right in the 1870 Act relating to the protection of
aliens was not couched in terms of racial equality nor was a determination of racial discrimination requisite to its invocation.
Note, supra note 19, at 158-59 (footnote omitted).
175. Compare the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872) with
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
176. See, e.g., Delavigne v. Delavigne, 530 F.2d 598 (4th Cir. 1976) (sex discrimination).
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tory language, legislative history, nor the traditions of judicial
federalism, the "denial" clause of the civil rights removal statute has atrophied to the point of virtual uselessness. The goal
of this Article has been to redefine the terms of the statute in
order to make possible a more rational interpretation of the
statutory language that will revitalize civil rights removal as a
mechanism for ensuring the vindication of federal rights
through adoption of a case-by-case analysis of the adequacy of
the state judicial process to protect those rights.
Although this revised interpretation may in certain ways
increase tension between the federal and state courts, the statute by its very terms contemplates at least a certain degree of
friction. The drafters apparently believed that such increased
tension was justified by the need to avoid the undermining of
specified federal rights by the state judiciary. In any event,
whatever tensions might develop as a result of a more expansive construction of the removal statute can be reduced or
wholly avoided in several ways. First, imposition of a heavy
burden on the removal petitioner to establish the existence of
improper state practices or procedures should deter many
would-be removal petitioners, thereby avoiding undue and substantial federal disruption of the state judicial process. Second,
if it were determined that this proposed revised construction
caused a significant increase in the number of frivolous or overzealous removal petitions, insertion of a requirement of federal
preliminary equitable relief prior to the cessation of the state
proceeding could substantially reduce the disruptive effect of
the removal device. While it is at best uncertain whether the
judiciary could interpose such a requirement, the establishment by Congress of an injunction prerequisite would be an appropriate modification of the civil rights removal statute. If this
were done, then the removal statute could, for the first time,
perform a significant role in establishing a proper allocation of
authority within the federal judicial system.

